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Abstract
Dramatic growth of investment disputes between foreign investors and host states rises serious
questions about the impact of those disputes on investors. This paper is the first to explain in-
creased uncertainty of investors about the outcome of arbitration, which may or may not lead
to compensation for damages claimed by the investor. We find robust evidence that invest-
ment disputes lead to abnormal share fluctuations of companies involved in disputes with host
countries. Importantly, while a positive outcome for an investor decreases uncertainty back
to original levels, we document strong increase in the volatility of companies with negative
outcome for the investor. We find that several variables including size of the award, political
instability, location of arbitration, country of origin of investor or public policy considerations
in host country explain large portion of the investor’s uncertainty.
1 Introduction
Following the rapid growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) over the last 30 years or so, invest-
ment disputes between investors and host country states have also increased dramatically. This
is serious since FDI have been the key factor of global economic growth during the period, and
investment disputes can jeopardize economic prosperity, global fight against poverty, diseases and
other public mal (Gonzalez and Kusek, 2018; Newman et al., 2015; Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez,
2015). Investment disputes have many origins ranging from direct expropriation of investors as-
sets to disputes about various regulatory interventions impeding business of the investors. They
all can seriously affect the profitability of FDI. The resolution of disputes takes place under the
legal provisions of different international investment agreements (IIA) and, most frequently, under
bilateral investment agreements (BIT), which stipulate, inter alia the rules and procedures for the
resolution of disputes through international arbitration. The main purpose of these agreements is
to protect foreign investors even though some, especially some of the more recent ones include
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also provisions to improve market access for foreign firms (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012; Juillard,
2000).1
Investment disputes can be very costly (Hajzler, 2012). Host countries may suffer adverse
reputational costs, high litigation costs and high costs of compensations. For many poor countries,
the costs of litigation can be excessive and the arbitration is sometimes accessible only with the
help of foreign aid. Pari passu, an involvement of investors in disputes with foreign governments
can increase uncertainties about the conduct of their business, and the market may perceive the firm
as a greater risk. Should investors lose the arbitration, the disputes will lead not only to litigation
costs but also to lost income. The relative costs to investors will depend on the value of the claim
relative to the size of the balance sheet of the firm and the actual outcome of the dispute.
The empirical literature dealing with investment disputes is extremely limited. It has been
almost exclusively concerned with the analysis of the effects of IIA on FDI. Most of the research
is not strictly about investment disputes because IIA are not only about investment protection but
also about market access, as noted above. Economic studies of investment disputes are few and all
are concentrated on three specific issues. First, the research has been entirely concentrated on host
countries and their benefits from FDI.2 The second important stream of the empirical literature has
involved an assessment of the performance of international arbitrations (Franck, 2007; Van Harten,
2011; Schultz and Dupont, 2014). The literature provides an empirical assessment of the litigation
explosion, focusing on (1) identifying the parties to disputes, and the subject of the arbitration;
(2) increases in awards, (3) analysis of win/loss rates, (4) of amounts claimed and awarded, (5)
arbitration costs. (6) Attempts were also made to compare different dispute resolution processes,
(7) the role of nationality and gender of arbitrators and (8) assess the fairness and independence in
investment arbitration. They also ask about the costs of arbitrations whether the costs are excessive
in relation to benefits and how they relate to the levels of income. Third, an alternative approach to
the study of investment disputes is a recent attempt to link macroeconomic indicators and disputes
(Bellak and Leibrecht, 2020).3
On the other hand, there is no empirical literature that would examine the impact of FDI dis-
putes on investors.4 This is unfortunate because the disputes can affect the value of firms as well
as their incentives to relocate abroad. In addition, as disputes are very likely to affect the shares
of investor’s firm, they will also impact their trading in the market. We intend to explore this new
area of research.
The aim of our study is to assess the impact of investment disputes on the volatility of the
company’s shares. The risks and uncertainties originating in investment disputes are likely to
1The level of protection also varies among BITs (Alschner and Skougarevskiy, 2016). Note that the breach of
contract can “normally” only be initiated by investors and host countries typically do not have the right to challenge
breaches by investors. The latter are subject to standard commercial courts.
2The literature has been reviewed, for example, in Pohl (2018) and the empirical evidence is synthesized in Brada
et al. (2020).
3Bellak and Leibrecht (2020) also review the relevant literature.
4The only exception is a very recent attempt of Brada et al. (2020) who look in their event study at the effects
of arbitral decisions on the real returns of investing companies but the study has not yet been published. The study
currently exists as a working paper and is under review for publication. The authors find that “in cases where the
arbitrators rule in favor of the MNC and award it damages, the stock price and the value of the firm increase by
3 percent over the ten-day period following the announcement of the arbitrators decision.... In cases, where the
arbitration tribunal ruled against the MNC and awarded no monetary damages, the stock price of the firm declined by
2 percent”.
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be reflected in changes in the prices of shares of investors in the market. One approach to the
evaluation of the effects of disputes on investors is to estimate real rates of return of the investors.
Our approach is different. We document the impact of an investment dispute on the uncertainty
and on the stock price measured by the second moment, its volatility. As uncertainty rises about
business operations and hence about the risk of the stock, stock price volatility is likely to increase
with the emergence of disputes. Positive resolution of disputes in favor of the investor can be
expected to lead to a reduced uncertainty and, consequently, to lower stock volatility.
Academics, policy makers, traders and other financial practitioners have been trying to un-
derstand the uncertainty regarding future price fluctuations measured by volatility for decades.5
Whereas origins of price movements may have good economic sense or can be explained by eco-
nomic fundamentals or behavioral psychology, its ultimate causes are poorly known in all spec-
ulative markets. Rapidly changing fluctuations can hardly be attributed to a single cause. The
economic sources of movements typically include fundamental shocks affecting the economy, the
shocks to technology, to consumer preferences, to demographics, natural resources, monetary pol-
icy or other instruments. On the other hand, volatility is often attributed to changes in opinions
based on news, or psychology connected to the confidence or speculative enthusiasm.
Uncertainties about the outcome of investment disputes is the key towards understanding volatil-
ity of shares of firms involved in disputes that we aim to study.6 We view this uncertainty as an
unusual driver of volatility in excess of “normal” market uncertainty and volatility associated with
it as experienced by investors. Hence, as a proxy for the usual price fluctuations, we use broad S&P
500 index and we assume that it will help us control all the economic and psychological effects.
In addition, it is a widely accepted stylized fact that volatility is dynamically changing over time
Engle (1982); Bollerslev (1986) hence, by controlling for the time dynamics, we aim to test the
excess volatility around the outcome date.
Following Białkowski et al. (2008), we employ the GARCH model, which allows us to analyze
time varying volatility during a period preceding the announcement window. We shall examine the
pattern of volatility over a long period of time in which the critical day is the day when the outcome
is announced to the market. We make a distinction between disputes won by investors and those
that went in favor of host states. We also allow for the magnitude of compensation to see whether
and how it affects the volatility. Clearly, an arbitral award that brings in compensation for damages
in excess of the amounts claimed by the investor is likely to lead to “rewards” by the market and
vice versa. In addition, the data matching disputes with share prices are relatively limited. Small
samples create statistical problems, and we are pleased that we were able to work with a relatively
large sample.
The paper is divided into seven sections. The following section 2 provides a brief review of the
theoretical literature with the view of identifying specific origins of uncertainties related to arbitra-
tions. Section 3 covers our detailed description of data, its sources and the way the data has been
used in our work. Section 4 deals with methodological issues – especially a detailed description
of the GARCH model and the way it is used by us in the paper. The results of estimations are
5For a comprehensive early survey of the literature see Shiller (1992).
6It could be argued that poor judgement on the part of investors in the market could be another explanation of
volatility (e.g. Shiller (2015); Simon (1991); Kahneman (2003)), Fisman and Zitzewitz (2019) have recently proposed
a method of capturing the imperfections in in the investment behavior. In other words, one could theoretically dis-
tinguish between uncertainty about investment dispute and uncertainty pertaining the mind and decisions making of
investors. We clearly are working with the former rather than the latter.
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reported section 5. In section 6, we report the results of a robustness test and conclude with final
section 7.
2 The Theory in the Literature
Do disputes matter? Do they matter especially for investors? Investment disputes and their effects
have been discussed at length in the legal literature and typically only in the context of litigations
addressed by courts in the United States. International disputes originating in international trade
and investment have so far received far less attention in the literature, and among those disputes,
trade disputes have dominated the debate ( e.g. Mavroidis and Sykes (2005)).
For investment disputes to matter for investors, the disputes must affect – positively or nega-
tively – the value of the firm as a result of the dispute. From the literature dealing with litigations
in the United States we know that litigations/disputes matter for investors because they may indeed
affect the value of the firm (Arena and Ferris, 2017). It is only through the understanding of the
way disputes are resolved that the market can assess the risks emanating from the dispute for the
investor.
Ultimately, the question about disputes is – what is the value of awards? Until the decision
is taken, the value is uncertain. The value will, first of all, depend on whether the investors will
be at all able to receive compensation for his/her loss of current and future income. Note that
damages in the ISDS system cover not only losses of income in the past but also losses coming
from expected income in the future. Compensations in investment disputes are provided in the
form of cash payment rather than retaliation as it is the case in trade disputes. This means that
the award has a clear monetary value – in contrast to awards in the form of retaliations where the
value is far more complex and ambiguous. On the other hand, the fact that damages in investment
disputes are assessed as past losses as well as the value of future harms. This makes the evaluation
of the damages ambiguous for different reasons. The arbiters must have a solid command not only
over highly technical details of markets and the balance sheets of the investors but they will also
have to agree on the costs of money and other matters of discounting.7
The list of complications in assessing the value of awards does not end with the description
of challenges for economists and accountants. The legal literature points to another issue impor-
tant for evaluating cash payments: quality of courts and their ability to assess damages. Clearly,
courts in different jurisdictions do work differently and differences in their judgements cannot be
excluded.
Perhaps the most complex issue related to the evaluation of awards concerns the likely effect
of the award on welfare of the plaintiff and the defendant state. There are two, basically opposing
views about the effect. One view, originating in the legal literature, is that litigation leads to welfare
losses to both plaintiff and the defendant.8 The alternative view is that international arbitrations
may, in fact, help increase welfare. It will do so through the instrument of IIA which are seen as a
7For other differences see Ossa et al. (2020).
8As noted by Brada et al. (2020), the general premise of many studies is that there are joint wealth losses for the
plaintiff and the defendant corporations but that the biggest change in value is experienced by the firm being sued
(Bhagat et al., 1994; Bizjak and Coles, 1995; Bhagat et al., 1998). By winning the dispute, investor will reduce his
losses. Losing the disputes, his losses will augment.
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tool of increasing efficiency and hence welfare.9
The critics of international arbitration explain the welfare benefits for investors yet from an-
other perspective. For example, for Brada et al. (2020), international arbitrations are less risky than
litigations in national courts (presumably US) and they are biased....10 This argument echoes simi-
lar views that have been expressed in the literature on trade disputes (e.g. Horn et al. (2005)). The
differences suggest that arbitration under a BIT carries less risk and possibly greater rewards for
the plaintiff than does inter-firm litigation in national courts. These views are more or less shared
by other critics such as Sachs and Johnson (2019); Van Harten (2011); Rodrik (2017) and others.11
In contrast, investment disputes also generate uncertainties about the International System of Dis-
pute Settlement (ISDS) . To begin with, ISDS of investment disputes is different from that used
in the resolution of trade disputes (Ossa et al., 2020), they are subject to different provisions of
IIA and those provisions have been evolving over time (Pohl, 2018). This makes it more compli-
cated for market participants to evaluate and anticipate the outcomes of arbitrations. International
arbitration can be subject to different interpretations of agreed rules, and this, again, increases the
uncertainty and unpredictability of arbitrations. The jurisprudence of international investment law
is evolving and may sometimes lead to different interpretations of the same rule (Howse and Levin,
2020).
The differences in the views about international arbitration have serious implications for economists
and their attempts to assess empirically the effect of disputes on investors. The different percep-
tions about expected welfare gains complicate the choice of the dependent variable to be measured
– especially the choice between the absolute level of real rate of return and volatility of stock.
Given the theoretical differences in the expected changes of welfare, the expected level of the real
rate of return is ambiguous. Does the rate have to be necessarily above a benchmark or would some
other values be still be acceptable? This ambiguity is one of the reasons for the choice of volatility
as our dependent variable in this study. Other benefits of international arbitration to investors can
also be noted. They range from the value of government commitments to protect future profits of
investors to benefits from various signaling functions of government commitments or the benefits
from a better control of moral hazard.
However, the risks to investors are also considerable. The “classical” problem faced by in-
vestors is the expropriation risk, leading to costs of what is known as police carve–outs (Aisbett
et al., 2010a): Police carve/outs represent a range of regulations giving the host country govern-
ment certain degree of flexibility and allowing it to address a policy issue. The regulation may
9See. Ossa et al. (2020); Kohler and Staller (2019); Horn and Tangera˚s (2019).
10To quote Brada et al. (2020), “The pool of arbitrators is made up mostly of individuals from developed countries,
which are likely to be the homes of many MNCs, while respondents are frequently developing countries. If there is
some arbitrator bias in favor of the legal systems of developed countries or of the rights of investors from developed
countries, there is the possibility that plaintiffs are likely to obtain more favorable awards due to such bias on the part
of the arbitra-tors. Of course, the fact that arbitrators may reduce awards below the amounts claimed by plaintiffs does
not disprove that they may favor foreign investors in their decisions because plain-tiff investors have strong incentives
to overstate their claims, both to get large judgments and to encourage respondent states to settle claims rather than to
risk large losses in arbitration. Thus, even if arbitrators do reject some of the damages claimed by the plaintiffs, their
awards may still be more favorable to plaintiffs than the law and the facts of the case warrant.”
11It is not clear why costs and benefits of national litigation are comparable with costs and benefits of international
arbitrations when we discuss the effects of the latter on investors. Investors are not typically facing a choice between
litigation in their national courts or in national courts abroad. International arbitration is their only option in those
cases.
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lead to moral hazard and inefficiencies but a more serious problem is arguably the fact that they
represent a potential “hold up” problem. Once the investment is sunk, the expropriation of assets is
a “gain” for the host country in addition to the value the country generates for itself by addressing
the public policy issue.12
Another reason for high costs of investors are excessive regulatory takings.13 Host country
government’s regulations may be “weak” or “strong”. In the latter case, we say that regulatory
takings are excessive because they disregard the (welfare) interests of investors. As noted by
Aisbett et al. (2010b),the lack of regard for the investor’s welfare may lead to inefficient over-
regulation by the host even in the absence of a “hold-up” motivation. The same argument is made
by Horn and Tangera˚s (2019) in their paper on optimal investment agreements.
The third reason why the costs of investors may be understated is the fact that the costs of host
country’s regulations are seen by host country governments as being “external”. In other words,
host country governments do not typically internalize the costs that local regulations impose on
FDI. Those costs have to be born by the investor and even though the investor may attempt to pass
the costs onto consumers in the country they may not be able to do so due to competition.14
The fourth risk faced by investors is the enforceability of the arbiters’ decision even when the
decision is in their favor. In theory, the decision can be enforced only if the host country has
the resources to pay for the damages and when its acceptance of the decision is driven both by
its respect for the court and by its concerns about its reputational costs. The latter could be high
and affect the host country’s attractiveness to future business. Even though the costs of sovereign
defaults have lately increased Schumacher et al. (2018), and hence their willingness to comply
with the decision of the court, the risk of non-payment for damages remains high.
Finally, there are other costs that need to be mentioned such as currency risk that can be signif-
icant in countries with unstable currencies. National competitors do not normally take such risks.
In addition, considering differences in linguistic, cultural and historical backgrounds, it is arguable
whether the competitive conditions in the market are on a level playing field even if national treat-
ment and ( and MFN) are formally a part of the conditions of establishment and operations. The
reason is that NT and MFN provisions primarily focus on taxes and other financial instruments
and completely disregard the role of social, cultural and historical factors. Moreover, the legal
language of IIA is often vague. E.g. The NT provision, which calls for the same conditions “in
like circumstances” is clearly one example of many that have created many controversies in the
WTO DSB mechanism and in international arbitrations.15
In conclusion, the adjudication of claims made by investors and the evaluation of awards are
clearly a daunting task for arbiters of investment disputes. The task is complicated from moment
when the arbiters have to decide whether and which investor’s property right has been violated.
They then have to demonstrate that the right has been violated by the host country policy interven-
12Much of the recent literature on optimal investment agreements looks at ways of designing an optimal compensa-
tion mechanism in cases of indirect expropriation under IIA. For a review of the literature, see Aisbett et al. (2010a).
13The literature on regulatory takings originates in the paper by Blume et al. (1984) and it would be outside scope
of this paper to review it.
14As pointed out by Aisbett et al. (2010b), cost-internalization is the leading justification among legal scholars
for the U.S. Fifth Amendment, which states that private property shall not be taken for public purpose without just
compensation.
15Aisbett et al. (2010b) makes a similar point when they argue that “.. the treaties’ investor to state provision and the
use of international tribunals create an asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors, causing their circumstances
to be inherently “unlike”. Thus, there is a tension between the expropriation and the non-discrimination clauses.”
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tion, and they have to establish whether the intervention was within the police carve out provisions.
Finally, they must have a notion of the amount of damages that can be reasonably offered to the
investor once the claim has been accepted. The tasks involve many unknowns. As the outcome
of arbitration is uncertain so will have to be the expected impact on the firm’s value, and until the
decision is taken, the uncertainty must be translated into uncertainty about the valuation of the firm
by the market.
3 Data About International Investment Disputes
The research on investment treaty arbitration lacks a comprehensive data set of all disputes filed or
resolved. Transparency, the quality and public availability of investment disputes is improving but
the data must still be read with caution. There are various sources of data on investment disputes -
some are related to data on arbitrations produced by Oxford University Law Center and published
by Oxford University Press16or by Kluwer Arbitration,17 other sources originate in data on IIA
which cover, inter alia, information about dispute settlement mechanism. The most frequently used
sources of data on investment arbitration are documents released by the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development18 (UNCTAD), and International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes19 (ICSID). UNCTAD reports only “known” cases and will, therefore, exclude cases that
are not publicly known. In contrast, the ICSID statistics are also under-inclusive because they only
rely on data from cases covered under the ICSID jurisdiction.20 According to one estimate, the
ICSID cover about 70 percent of all disputes. Thus, the UNCTAD data are more “inclusive” than
the ICSID data but are also likely to be incomplete. In addition, neither of the two sources covers
each reported case with full information about the arbitral process, and we had to combine the two
sources. Despite the weaknesses, the documents are the best efforts representation of trends in
investment arbitration and should not significantly skew our analysis. There is also a recent effort
to provide a comprehensive list of all known cases in the form of publicly available dataset from
PITAD Investment Law and Arbitration Database.21 This source aims at providing an exhaustive
data set of all cases but, on the other hand, it lacks some of the information regarding the individual
cases which are provided in other sources such as UNCTAD or ICSID.
We work with the versions of the documents from January 2019. We scraped the data from the
respective web pages and had to merge the information when constructing our database in order to
obtain the information necessary for our estimations. On the one hand, the ICSID database contains
more detailed information regarding some of the variables. For example, it contains the exact
date of the registration of the dispute, which is needed as a control date in our experiments. The
information is not available in the UNCTAD source. On the other hand, ICSID does not explicitly
contain information regarding the final decision of the court and the amount claimed/awarded,
another important piece of information in our analysis. As a check of our merged data, we verified
16OUP Press Investment Claims: http://oxia.ouplaw.com
17Kluwer Arbitration : http://kluwerarbitration.com
18https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement
19https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx
20For more discussion of differences between both sources, see Shirlow (2015).
21https://pitad.org/index#static/about_pitad. See also https://www.acerislaw.com/
choosing-icsid-or-uncitral-arbitration-for-investor-state-disputes/
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that the key information contained in both databases such the outcome date match in both sources.
Table 1 provides a list of all cases that are included in the analysis. In total, we work with a sample
of 46 cases that resulted in a decision in favor of either party or were settled or discontinued. Out
of these 46 cases, 25 cases were decided in favor of the investor, 10 in favor of the state, and 11
were either settled or discontinued.
We should note that while we were able to extract information about a large number of compa-
nies from the combination of the two documents, only a small part of the data could finally be used
in the analysis. The reason is that we needed to match the data from both sources with stock mar-
ket data of the companies. Unfortunatelly, the number of companies involved in disputes whose
shares were also traded in stock markets was relatively limited. The limitations on the availability
of the liquid price information of the claimant (an individual or company) constrained the size of
our sample. Most of the investment agreements were BITs between the investor’s and the host
countries, but the claims included in our sample were also brought under NAFTA, CIS Investor
Rights Convention and the Energy Charter Treaty provisions. Our sample covers the period in
which the year of initiation of dispute resolution ranges between 1998 and 2014, and the year of
decision (outcome of the arbitration) is between 2000 and 2017. The investments disputes cover
all economic sectors (primary 10, secondary 8, and tertiary). Table 1 also contains information
about the investor’s country (highest number from the United States - 12), the host country (high-
est number from Argentina - 10), and the amount claimed by the investor and amount rewarded
by the tribunal.22 With the exception of China, all of the investor’s countries are developed coun-
tries. As for the host countries, seven cases come from transition countries and thirty three from
emerging markets.
Information regarding the stock prices was obtained from Yahoo Finance.23 In order to isolate
the effect of investment dispute resolution from general market movements, we removed the effect
of the aggregate market from the stock price of the investor’s firm. We use the S&P500 index as
a proxy for general market changes because most of the companies in our sample operate interna-
tionally and the S&P500 market is a good proxy for the stock market globally. By using one single
benchmark, we also limit the effect of differences in stock price volatility in different securities
markets. Stock prices employed are either direct prices of the company that made the investment,
or prices of the parent’s company.
22The size of the sample was constrained by a number of other factors. In some arbitral proceedings, the arbitrators
declined jurisdiction over the dispute. Many cases could not be used in our sample because the plaintiffs (individuals
or firms) were not listed on any stock exchange. Moreover, MNC often use affiliates as a vehicle for their FDI, and
those affiliates are also not listed in stock exchanges.
23https://finance.yahoo.com
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4 Measurement of Abnormal Volatility Around the Outcome
Date
Volatility, as a proxy for the uncertainty in the markets, has been one of the most important phe-
nomena studied in financial economics. In his seminal work on stock market volatility, Shiller
(1981) argues that the observed volatility is not consistent with the predictions of the present value
models and that the high intertemporal variation cannot be rationalized on that basis. The failure
of standard valuation models to explain the high magnitudes of stock market fluctuations opened
serious challenge to financial economists, and literature started the search for the volatility drivers
different from conventional dividends and earnings. One strand of the literature examines whether
the variability of returns can be linked to macroeconomic variables, financial leverage, or trading
volume (e.g. Schwert (1989); Binder and Merges (2001); Engle et al. (2013)).
A different route is explored by event studies connecting the excess volatility with some event.24
From early efforts summarized by Yadav (1992), researchers subsequently studied the reaction of
volatility to political events such as national elections (Białkowski et al., 2008), mergers and ac-
quisitions (Balaban and Constantinou, 2006) or terrorist attacks (Essaddam and Mnasri, 2015).
Abnormal volatility, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been connected to the investment
disputes.
To account for strong time variation in volatility, we need to step forward from traditional
event study techniques. Estimating the model that will capture the time varying volatility during
the window period immediately preceding the outcome window and including the market volatility
as control variable for volatility induced by market, we will first estimate an expected, or an usual
volatility under the null hypothesis of no reaction of the market to the event. Then to see if the
resolution of the dispute induced changes in the volatility, we will compare this expectation to the
measured volatility in the time window around the outcome date. The key aspect of the method-
ology used is to capture the usual time varying volatility, which allows us to measure abnormal
variation in response to the event. Moreover, following Białkowski et al. (2008), we construct a
bootstrap procedure to our tests in order to mitigate small sample bias.
Let us discuss the procedure in detail. The key date is the outcome date tO. The announcement
date of the investor’s claim is not taken as a “surprise date” as market will have the information
already processed from media. The surprise cannot be measured and timed, but the outcome day
can be timed. The data are measured over the time period t ∈ [1, . . . , T ] so that t = 1 is the starting
date and t = T is end of that period, so that outcome date tO is inside of the interval defined as
1 < tO < T . This allows us to capture the specifics of each stock.25 Since uncertainty about the
outcome will probably result in an abrupt volatility changes even before the announcement day,
we focus on the time window around the outcome date that includes certain period of time before
24The approach also involves less stringent assumptions than those required in standard event studies. The latter
typically look at the effect of investment disputes on the absolute level of real returns. To do so, they need to consider
the relationship between the absolute level of award in arbitration and the change in the firm’s value in order to assess
the real damages to investor. This strict assumption is not necessary in studies of volatility. Yet another approach has
recently been suggested – judgement of investors in the market. As Fisman and Zitzewitz (2019) suggest, investors’
poor judgement may be the reason for volatility. We assume in this paper that poor judgement does not characterize
all market participants and that individual mistakes do not dominate the market.
25Note that the dates of claims and the dates of decisions differ from case to case. Note also that the announcement
is given as an announcement window, which we define further below.
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as well as after the outcome. Formally, the window of interest is defined as [tO−NB, tO+NA] with
NB and NA being a fixed number of days before and after the outcome day tO respectively, and we
will refer to it as an announcement window.26
We start by estimating the case-specific component of variance for all companies in the sample
i = 1, . . . , K with generalized auto-regressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model
over time period t ∈ [tO −NB − 500, . . . , tO −NB] immediately before the event window as
ri,t = α + βr
S&P 500
t + i,t (1)
i,t ∼ N (0, σ2i,t) (2)
σ2i,t = ψ0 + ψ1σ
2
i,t−1 + ψ2
2
i,t−1 (3)
where ri,t is logarithmic return of the ith company and rS&P 500t is stock market return represented
by the S&P 500 market index.
The model described by equations 1 - 3 is a GARCH(1,1) model and is one of the most popular
and useful frameworks for capturing the time varying volatility. Engle (1982); Bollerslev (1986)
noted that returns described by equation 1 display strong time variation in its second moment,
volatility, and proposed to describe it by latent dynamics in 3 assuming the residuals 2 being
normally distributed.27 We chose to estimate the model for the period of 500 days immediately
before the announcement window. This should allow the period to be reasonably long in order
for the market to absorb the information and to address the possibility of the small sample bias
(Hwang and Valls Pereira, 2006).
Being interested in measurement of abnormal volatility, we consider variation in i,t around
the outcome date (i.e. outcome window) in relation to the usual volatility estimated in the period
before the outcome window. In other words, model described by equations 1 – 3 will indicate the
level of expected usual volatility under the null hypothesis of no reaction to the announcement of
the resolution. Comparison of the modelled volatility to the volatility measured by the actual data
will then indicate the abnormal volatility. Abnormal volatility is further controlled for stock market
volatility. Note that this benchmark volatility captures time dynamics in the volatility as well as
volatility induced by S&P500 that is by estimating β coefficient, and including market returns into
the model directly. Formally, we define it as a k-step-ahead forecast of the variance conditional on
the information available on the last day of the period before the announcement window
Et
[
σ2i,t+k|It
]
= γ̂0
k−1∑
j=0
(γ̂1 + γ̂2)
j + (γ̂1 + γ̂2)
k−1γ̂1σ2i,t + (γ̂1 + γ̂2)
k−1γ̂1i,t (4)
Importantly, the distribution of the residuals during the announcement window can be described as
i,t ∼ N (ARt,MtEt
[
σ2i,t+k|It
]
) where the residuals will on average hold abnormal return ARt,
26In real world, the announcement window could be “contaminated” by “other events”. We proxy the contamination
by “other events” by looking at the excess volatility controlled by returns (and volatility as well) of S&P500 index and
assume that S&P500 controls for this effect as we discuss the best practice option in the text.
27Note that GARCH(1,1) is powerful benchmark that captures the time variation in volatility well. Large literature
trying to extend the model in various ways does not find significant improvements of out-of-sample forecasts. An
interesting survey of Hansen and Lunde (2005) summarizes and compares 330 extensions and find no evidence that
GARCH(1,1) is outperformed by more sophisticated models. Hence we chose the model as a best parsimonious
choice.
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andMt is the multiplicative effect of the announcement-induced volatility. Under the null hypoth-
esis that investors are not surprised by outcome of the dispute,28 the parameter Mt = 1. Given
our interest in capturing the effect of investment disputes on volatility, announcement-induced
volatility Mt is of primary interest and needs to be estimated. By noting that residuals de-
meaned using cross-sectional average are normally distributed with zero mean and announcement-
independent variance, we can estimate theMt as the cross-sectional variance of demeaned resid-
uals by announcement-independent standard deviation (Boehmer et al., 1991)
M̂t = 1/(K − 1)
K∑
i=1
( (
K̂i,t −
∑K
j=1 ̂j,t
)2
K(K − 2)Et
[
σ2i,t|It
]
+
∑K
j=1 Et
[
σ2j,t|It
]) (5)
with ̂i,t = ri,t − α̂− β̂rS&P 500t and t ∈ [tO −NB, tO +NA].
Since residuals follow standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis whenMt = 1,
abnormal change in volatility isMt−1, and hence the cumulative abnormal volatility CAV
(
NB, NA
)
can be computed as
CAV
(
NB, NA
)
=
(
tO+NA∑
t=tO−NB
M̂t
)
− (NA −NB + 1). (6)
The null hypothesis of no impact of investment dispute on volatility
H0 : CAV
(
NB, NA
)
= 0 (7)
is equivalent to
H0 :
tO+NA∑
t=tO−NB
Mt(K − 1) = (NA −NB + 1)(K − 1), (8)
and can be tested noting that under the null,Mt is a variance of K independent N (0, 1) random
variables implying the test statistic for the hypothesis is χ2 distributed as
tO+NA∑
t=tO−NB
(K − 1)M̂t ∼ χ2(K−1)(NB−NA+1). (9)
Moreover, inference based on the asymptotic values may be biased in case of non-normally dis-
tributed residuals, cross-sectional dependence, or autocorrelation structures that are likely to be
observed in the data. As suggested by Białkowski et al. (2008), we additionally construct a boot-
strap test based on Efron (1992). The cumulative abnormal volatility during the announcement
window is compared with the empirical distribution of CAV
(
NB, NA
)
simulated under the null
hypothesis. The procedure for generating the empirical distribution can be described as follows:
28Note that we are making a distinction between two situations to be considered by the market – event or no event.
We do not differentiate among different outcomes of the event. The assumption seems reasonable since it is impossible
for the market to predict the precise outcome of the arbitration.
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1. Draw the case and date to match the number of outcomes in the original sample randomly
with replacement from the whole dataset.
2. Compute CAV
(
NB, NA
)
from the randomly generated sample from step (1).
3. Repeat step (1) and (2) 5000 times, sort the estimated CAV
(
NB, NA
)
in order to obtain
empirical distribution.
The bootstrapped p-value is then computed as the number of bootstrapped CAV
(
NB, NA
)
that
exceed the CAV
(
NB, NA
)
calculated on the original election date, divided by the number of
replications. Note this is one-sided test to test the null hypothesis against the alternative HA :
CAV
(
NB, NA
)
> 0, but in case the number of bootstrapped statistics below the value of statistics
estimated on data is used, alternative hypothesis HA : CAV
(
NB, NA
)
< 0 can be tested. In
other words, we can confirm if the potential volatility connected to the dispute is increasing or
decreasing.
5 Results: Return Volatility around the Outcome of the Invest-
ment Dispute
We chose the outcome date to be the main event for the choice of the announcement window. We
divide the sample into cases in which the decision was made in favor of the state, cases with the
decision in favor of investor, as well as cases that have been discontinued or settled. These three
groups are distinct in their potential impact of the decision on the plaintiff company, and hence we
expect a very different reaction of investors. While our expectation is that the decision in favor of
state will result in increased volatility, capturing increased uncertainty about the prices since the
decision may lead to large costs for the company. On the other hand, cases with decisions in favor
of investor as well as those that were settled are likely to show the opposite pattern of volatility.
Figure 1 shows the estimates of the cumulative abnormal volatility ĈAV
(
NB, NA
)
for the
three samples. We choose to include one month before the outcome date as well as two months
after the outcome day in the announcement window to see the increased uncertainty before the
announcement date.
As can be seen from Figure 1, we document a surge in the volatility of cases decided in favor
of state. The increase in the volatility started even before the outcome date ( about two weeks prior
to the date of the outcome), presumably in the anticipation of the results or news leaks. After the
outcome day, the volatility continues to surge steadily every single day throughout the two months
period and even beyond. A very different pattern is documented for the cases when the decision
has been made in favor of investor. Here the volatility decreases gradually. Cases that have been
settled or discontinued show no abnormal volatility while volatility decreases slightly at the end of
the reaction window.
To test the significance of the results, we compute the cumulative abnormal volatility ĈAV
(
NB, NA
)
statistics for different window windows of 2 days, 1 week, 2weeks, 1month and 2 months before
13
Figure 1: Volatility reaction to the Dispute Outcome
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Notes: The figure shows cumulative abnormal volatility ĈAV
(
NB , NA
)
around the outcome day. Reaction of companies with positive outcome
are captured by dashed line, reaction of companies with negative outcome (in favor of state) in black, the ones settled out of court or undecided are
in dotted line. The window is one month before and two months after the announcement day.
as well as after the outcome day. Specifically, Table 2 displays the cumulative abnormal volatility
in the first column, theoretical as well as bootstrapped p-values in the third and fourth columns re-
spectively. In addition, the second column of the Table 2 holds percentage change of the volatility
relative to the benchmark.
The results confirm the significant increase of abnormal volatility of the cases decided in favor
of state in longer than 2 weeks period. The percentage volatility increase is growing with the pe-
riod, and abnormal volatility of cases decided in favor of state cumulated by 60.5% in the 1 month
before – 2 months after the outcome day window. In contrast, cumulative abnormal volatility in
the cases decided in favor of investors decreased over time, resulting in a significant decrease in
abnormal volatility. Investors thus reacted to the “good news” with smaller than the usual volatility
– by a decrease of -17.4%. Discontinued or settled cases show a similar pattern to those decided
in favor of investor with decrease in abnormal volatility of -14.5%. In brief, volatility of the com-
pany’s shares was increased as uncertainty about the outcome set in. When the outcome decision
was in favor of investor, the uncertainty decreased back to its “normal” level, and hence the ex-
cess – abnormal volatility disappeared. On the other hand, if the decision was in favor of state,
it increased the uncertainty about the impact of the decision on the balance sheet of the company
reflecting partly the loss of income of the investor and partly the cost of litigation.
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Table 2: Cumulative abnormal volatility around Decision Day
Announcement window ĈAV % vol p-val p-val boot
Panel A: Decision in favour of Investor
(-2 days,2 days) -1.010 -0.202 0.054 0.118
(-1 week,1 week) 2.863 0.260 0.003 0.083
(-2 week,2 weeks) 1.624 0.077 0.116 0.327
(-1 month,1 month) -7.387 -0.145 0.000 0.003
(-1 month,2 months) -13.190 -0.174 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Decision in favour of State
(-2 days ,2 days) 1.141 0.228 0.129 0.337
(-1 week,1 week) 1.686 0.153 0.129 0.402
(-2 weeks,2 weeks) 27.653 0.317 0.000 0.000
(-1 month,1 month) 19.763 0.388 0.000 0.015
(-1 month,2 months) 45.949 0.605 0.000 0.000
Panel C: Discontinued/Settled
(-2 days,2 days) -1.691 -0.338 0.031 0.055
(-1 week,1 week) -3.700 -0.336 0.003 0.007
(-2 week,2 weeks) 3.279 0.156 0.000 0.285
(-1 month,1 month) 0.444 0.009 0.000 0.708
(-1 month,2 months) -10.859 -0.143 0.000 0.002
Notes: The table contains cumulative abnormal volatility ĈAV
(
NB , NA
)
around
the outcome day. Panel A of the table reports results for the cases decided in fa-
vor of Investor, Panel B reports the results for the cases decided in favor of state,
and Panel C reports cases that were discontinued or settled. The implied percentage
change (% vol) relative to the benchmark, asymptotic p-values as well as p-values
computed on 5000 bootstraps are reported and test the null hypothesis of no reaction
H0 : ĈAV
(
NB , NA
)
= 0.
6 Robustness Tests
The previous section presented our estimates of abnormal volatility based on the GARCH model,
which serves as the benchmark for volatility without the event. We have isolated the case – specific
component of variance within GARCH. In order to avoid a bias in estimating abnormal volatility,
we have estimated the variance conditional to the prior dates of the event. To recall, the variance
was estimated by the event independent demeaned standard deviation (EIDSD). As we have also
noted, potential complications may arise from non-normality, cross-sectional dependence, or au-
tocorrelation of the regression residuals. To circumvent those problems, the statistical significance
of the impact of disputes was additionally tested using the bootstrap methodology. We shall now
consider additional issues in order to test the robustness of our results. We begin with a few com-
ments about the likelihood of additional sources of biasedness of our results. In addition, we shall
deeper explore the sources of the abnormal volatility in order to provide a stronger justification for
our hypothesis.
Comments on biasedness. Given the size of our sample, it could be argued that our result are
biased due to the relatively small size of our sample. We have, therefore, taken additional steps to
address the issue. We have chosen the time window during which the volatility is measured and
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assessed long enough in order to minimize the possibility of a small sample bias. Pari passu, it
could be argued that our sample is biased by volatility of shares of a large company that may be
dominating our sample. Once again, such concerns are not justified. To recall, we have estimated
the excess volatility of each stock in our sample, produced 46 excess volatilities and we report
the median. We should also note that reporting the mean does not influence the main results.
We have checked the estimates of each case and have found no major deviation among them. In
addition, there is no strong theoretical reason to believe that volatility of large firms should be
different – larger or smaller – than volatility of shares of smaller companies. Finally, there is a
solid econometric ground to argue that our results cannot be driven by “excessive” volatility of
shares of single large company. Using the GARCH model, it is clear that an “excessive” volatility
of shares of a large firm would affect not only our sample but also the volatility of our benchmark.
Origins of Volatility. Why should we observe these particular patterns of volatility? Are there
any reasons beyond saying that the volatility was brought about by uncertainty about the dispute?
Can we justify linking the abnormal volatility to particular features of the host countries and/or
features of the arbitration process? To explore these issues, we have built a model in which we
have tested the influence of factors that might have determined the link between uncertainty and
volatility of share prices. First, the size of award should clearly be important. It obviously matters
whether compensations to investors are small or large in relation to damages or to claims for
damages.29 We expect the level of compensation to have a negative coefficient. The larger the
proportion of the award from the original claim, the less uncertainty about the recovery of damages
incurred by the investor and hence the better the impact of the award on the financial position of
the investor. Second, many disputes involved host countries with several cases against them. The
fact that a country is facing multiple disputes is serious problem; it tarnishes the reputation of the
country and makes it more risky. In addition, if the host country in question is a poor country,
the exposure to disputes clearly becomes a financial problem for the government. Third and pari
passu, the uncertainty is likely to be affected by political instability in host country (Kurz et al.,
2005; Irshad, 2017). For example, the government claiming that the conditions of the BIT were
agreed and signed by the previous government may not be acceptable and may not accept the
decision of the court in favor of investor. Fourth, according some international legal scholars, the
location of arbitration and/or the choice of arbitral rules may also matter (Pohl et al., 2012; Howse
and Levin, 2020). Fifth, volatility may also be affected by the country of origin of investor. As it
is well known from the financial literature, the appetite for risk is to a large extent determined by
culture (e.g. Li et al. (2013); Kreiser et al. (2010); Mihet (2013)). Finally, a very large proportion
of disputes between states and investors involve protection of public interest (e.g. Schill and Djanic
(2018); Johnson et al. (2015)). Governments have sometimes taken measures to protect domestic
public interest, and those measures have led to legal challenges by foreign investors. The range
of actions (or inactions) by host governments has been large, and it would be beyond the scope
of this paper to test the significance of each intervention or policy stance.30 As a first step, we
shall try to capture the role of public interest in the litigation of investment disputes by looking
29As noted in Section 2, the level of compensation is important particularly because it should cover not only lost
profits in the past but also profits that investors could reasonably expect in future.
30As argued by Johnson et al. (2015), “Available evidence regarding the approximately 600 known ISDS suits filed
to date indicate that investors can use the mechanism to contest a virtually unlimited range of actions (or inactions),
including measures relating to taxation, environmental regulation, tariffs for water and electricity, health insurance
regulation, and health and safety regulations of pharmaceutical imports, among others.”
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at the role of two most contested rules from IIAs – indirect expropriation and “full protection and
security” of investors. Both represent two areas in which public interest and policy are said to have
been at the origin of breaches of commitments under those agreements. The lack of clarity of both
provisions is undoubtedly an important origin of uncertainty in the markets. Unfortunately, there
is a strong reason to believe that, the two factors are also strongly correlated,31 and we had to limit
our analysis to “indirect expropriation” only. Moreover, the unpredictability of decisions under
these two provisions is further enhanced by disagreements among economists about the impact of
regulatory measures on investment.32 Our model takes the following form:
AV i = α+βSASAi+βPICPICi+βRLRLi+βPIC,RLPICi×RLi+βARARi+βCOCOi+βIEIEi+i (10)
Where AV t is abnormal volatility calculated as the volatility ratio constructed by dividing the
variance of real returns over the event window by the variance of real returns in the pre-event
window. Our independent variables are SA for the size of the award, PIC for political instability
and corruption, RL for rule of law, AR for the type of arbitral rules, CO for country of origin, IE
for “indirect expropriation” as the reason for the breach of investor’s rights. On the other hand, we
also expect a positive effect on volatility in the case of the multiple dispute country and political
instability variables.
Unfortunately, we were also constrained by the size of our sample. As noted above, our original
sample included 46 observations but as we had to restrict our analysis to cases actually won by
investors, we have ended up with 29 observations. 17 observations were “lost” since they referred
to disputes settled out of court or to the disputes that were abandoned. Suspecting some degree of
correlation, we have included in the model an interaction term between the variables captured by
βPIC,RL , which turns out insignificant but it leaves all other estimates fundamentally unchanged.
The terms provides, therefore, an important statistiacal control.
As we can see from Table 3, we can explain a great deal of the abnormal volatility in our sample
of foreign investment disputes. The level of compensation as a proportion of the investor’s claim
had a negative impact on the change in volatility even if the estimate is only significant at the 5
percent level. Both corruption and rule of law are significant and with the right sign. As expected,
the results are also affected by the country of origin of investors. The results are sensitive as to
whether investors come from the US or not. Interestingly enough, the results are also sensitive to
two particular features of the arbitration system – (i) whether the legal proceedings are handled un-
der UNCITRAL or not and (ii) whether the subject of the alleged breach is “indirect expropriation”
or not. Surprisingly, length of the process turned out to be insignificant. The adjusted R-square
explains 32% of the abnormal volatility.
The greater sensitivity of the market to dispute proceedings handled under UNCITRAL may
have different explanations. For example, it is widely accepted that UNCITRAL arbitral tribunals
have historically been more permissive with respect to allowing the claims of dual nationals.
31Many cases of “indirect expropriation” were also classified as breaches of “full protection and security”, presum-
ably reflecting plaintiffs’ charges as violations of both provisions. We tried but were unable to appropriate econometric
adjustments to deal with this correlation problem.
32Economists disagree about whether police-powers carve-outs promote foreign investments or not. “Weak” policy
carve-outs may promote FDI and ,with guaranteed compensation, may lead to overinvestment. Strong policy carve-out
may lead to underinvestment. However, Aisbett et al. (2010a) argues that “underinvestment” may happen even with
guaranteed compensation. The debate has led to the literature on optimal investment agreements. See, for example,
Horn and Tangera˚s (2019).
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Table 3: Explanation of excess volatility
Estimate Std. Error t value P-val
Intercept 1.044 0.174 6.004 0.000 ***
βSA -0.073 0.040 -1.813 0.082 *
βRL -0.365 0.166 -2.193 0.038 **
βPIC 0.416 0.199 2.090 0.047 **
βAR -0.184 0.105 -1.747 0.093 *
βCO -0.214 0.118 -1.813 0.082 *
βIE 0.256 0.139 1.847 0.077 *
βPIC,RL 0.057 0.050 1.140 0.265
adjR2 0.3281
Notes: The table presents results of regression linking the abnormal volatil-
ity induced by investment disputes to independent varianbles SA – size of the
award, PIC – political instability and corruption, RL – rule of law, AR – the
type of arbitral rules, CO – country of origin, IE – “indirect expropriation”
as the reason for the breach of investor’s rights.. The dependent variable is
defined as natural logarithm of the volatility ratio constructed by dividing the
return variance computed over the event window by the variance of returns in
pre-event window.
UNCITRAL tribunals are also less likely to refuse jurisdiction on the basis that a dispute arises
from an economic activity that does not qualify as an investment. UNCITRAL awards may face
additional scrutiny at the level of State courts, which may be either positive or negative.33 Disputes
about host country interventions that are considered by investors as measures leading to “indirect
expropriation” are clearly a highly destabilizing factor in the market. The main source of unpre-
dictability of disputes about the rule is uncertainty about the interpretation by the host country
government of what the government considers the legitimate police-powers carve-out.
7 Conclusion
Our main aim in this paper is to assess the impact of international investment disputes on the value
of the investors’ firm. We do so by analyzing the second movement of the impact on shares –
on their volatility. Using the GARCH model, we estimate the cumulative average volatility of
shares in our sample and compare our estimates against the benchmark. The key aspect of the
methodology is to capture the usual time varying volatility, which allows us to measure abnormal
variation in response to an event. In contrast to standard event studies, we do not use a single day
window but a window of few days.
We find that investment disputes lead to abnormal volatility of shares of companies involved in
disputes with host countries. Markets do respond to information about the emergence of disputes
between those companies and host countries. We associate the increased volatility with increased
uncertainty in the market about the outcome of arbitration which may or may not lead to com-
pensation for damages claimed by the investor. Our second important result is that the outcome
of arbitration is also very important in explaining the volatility of shares of both “winning” and
33Choosing ICSID or UNCITRAL Arbitration for Investor-State Disputes, 29/06/2018 by Aceris Law LLC https:
//www.acerislaw.com
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“losing” investors. When the decision from arbitration went in favor of state, volatility of shares of
the investors clearly increased. In contrast, when the decision of arbiters went in favor of investors,
volatility of their shares visibly declined. We explain this diverging pattern by the likely impact
of the decisions on the investors’ balance sheets and hence the value of their firms. The impact is
negative in the former case and positive in the latter.
In order to see whether our results and the story explaining them are plausible and believable,
we have conducted a number additional tests of robustness. As noted, the risk of small sample
bias was minimized by applying the bootstrap method. Abnormal volatility is further controlled
for stock market volatility. We also take measures to ensure that firm size is not influencing our
estimates of factors of volatility. Most importantly, to test the significance of the results, we com-
pute the cumulative abnormal volatility statistics for different windows of 2 days, 1 week, 2weeks,
1month and 2 months before as well as after the outcome day.
Given the fact that there is a strong evidence of volatility, the key question is how uncertainty
was affected by factors related to the arbitration awards or to the specific features of the markets.
We have identified several variables that we believe should play a role in the risk assessment
such as size of the award, the length of the arbitration process, the number of disputes in which
host country is involved. In addition, we included four factors that have been identified in the
literature – political instability, location of arbitration, country of origin of investor and public
policy considerations in host country. Using a regression analysis we find that all these factors,
with the exception of the length of process are statistically significant and explain a large part of
the abnormal volatility linked to the disputes in point.
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